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POWER OF PARTNERS TO WITHDRAW AT WILL
FROM PARTNERSHIPS ENTERED INTO FOR A
DEFINITE PERIOD.
IT is well settled that a partnership for an indefinite period, may
be dissolved at will by either partner at any time when the dissolu-
tion will not cause his copartners to suffer extraordinary loss,
provided the act of dissolution is free from fraud: -Fletcher v.
Reid, 131 Mass. 312; Pine v. Ormsbee, 2 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 375;
(arlton v. Cummin8, 51 Ind. 478; Peathertonhauh v. PFenwick,
17 Ves. 298; Peacock v. Peacock, 16 Id. 50.
And it has been asserted that partners have the same power of
withdrawal where their articles of agreement provide that the
partnership shall continue for a definite period, or until the hap-
ening of a certain event.
In support of this view of the law it has been contended that it
is contrary to public policy to force a man to continue in partner-
ship with another against his will, because it i§. calculated to
encourage discord and litigation and to cause a loss of national
wealth; and Chancellor KENT has added (3 Com. 55), that the
power of withdrawal in such cases "would seem to be implied in
the capacity of a partner to interfere and dissent from a purchase
or contract about to be made by his association."
But it may be argued on the other hand, that the power of
dissent referred to by Chancellor KENT, is very different from a
power to destroy the copartnership, and is, moreover, by no means
boundless, inasmuch as the majority of the partners are entitled to
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rule. As to public policy, like liberty, it has afforded a pretext
for much evil. Questions concerning it should be left to the legis-
latures. Moreover it may well be doubted whether it is ever for
the good of the public to encourage dishonesty, and for a partner
to withdraw from a partnership without just cause, and in viola-
tion of an express agreement, is certainly not only dishonorable but
dishonest.
CIVIL AND FOREIGN LAW.-The authorities are conflicting as to
the civil law upon this subject. Chancellor KENT says (3 Com.
55), that "the Commentators on the Institutes lay downi the prin-
ciple as drawn from the common law, that each partner has a
power to dissolve the connection at any time, notwithstanding any
convention to the contrary, and that the power results from the
nature of the association. They hold every such convention null,
and that it is for the public interest that no partner should be
obliged to continue in such a partnership against his will, inasmuch
as the community of goods in such cases engenders discord and
litigation; "and he cites, Vinnius in Inst. 3, 26, 4, pl. 1; Ferriere,
Ibid. tom. iv. 156, Dig. 17, 2, 14; Domat, b. 1, tit. 8, sect. 5,
'and art. 1 to 8 by Strahan.
But a different view is taken by Pothier, whose opinion is enti-
tled to great weight. He says that where partners agree upon the
time for which the partnership is to continue, they "are considered
to agree not to dissolve it until after the expiration of that time,
unless there happen some just cause for dissolving it sooner.
Therefore one of them cannot, without just cause, dissolve the
partnership before the time to the prejudice of his partners. Qui
societatem in tempus coit earn ante tempus renuntiando socium a se
non se a socii liberat; 165 sect. 6, Dig. lib. xvi., tit. 2, 1. 65,
sect. 6." (Pothier on Partnerships, sect. 
152.)
And the rule laid down by him is the one adopted by the mod-
ern Code of France, and substantially the same principles prevail
in Scotland: (Story on Part., sect. 274; Bell's Law of Scotland,
sect. 378.) Story quotes Pothier with approv'l (Story on Part.,
sect. 276), and the fact that the rule laid down by Pothier is the
one adopted in those countries where the civil law prevails, is
strong evidence of its correctness.
THE ENGLISH RUtE.-In England there is no conflict of
authority. The settled rule, both at law and equity, is the same
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as the rule of the civil law upon the subject as laid down by
Pothier. "If," said Lord ELDON, in Crawshay v. Afaule, 1
Swanst. Ch. 509, "men will enter into a partnership as into a
marriage, for better and worse, they must abide by it; but if they
enter into it without saying how long it shall endure, they are
understood to take that course in the expectation that circum-
stances may arise in which a dissolution will be the only means of
saving them from ruin." The same distinction between partner-
ships for a definite, and those for an indefinite period, has also been
more or less distinctly recognised in the following cases: Beather-
stonhaugh v. PFenwick, 17 Ves. 298; Peacock v. Peacock, 16 Id.
49; Crawslhay v. Maule, 1 Swanst. Ch. 509; Wrexham v. Hudleston,
Id. 514 n. ; and also in the following authoritative English text
books, viz.: 1 Lindley on Part. 220, 222; Collyer on Part., sect.
105; Pollock's Dig. of the Law of Part., arts. 41, 42.
A. court of equity will not, as a general rule, attempt to enforce
a contract of partnership for an indefinite period, but it will enter-
tain a bill for the specific performance of articles of copartnership
which provide that the association shall endure for a specified
length of time. Thus, in the case of England v. Curling, 8 Beav.
129, where the bill prayed that an agreement for a copartnership
for fourteen years might be specifically performed, and for an
injunction to restrain the other parties to the agreement from
engaging in the same branch of business transacted by the firm,
alone or with other persons, before the expiration of the term men-
tioned in the agreement, specific performance was decreed and the
injunction granted. In delivering the opinion of the court, when
the case was finally disposed of, Lord LANGDALE, M. R., said:
"1 This business has been carried on for one year since the injunc-
tion was granted, but under circumstances which cannot render it
beneficial to any one. This is a difficulty which always arises
when partnership contracts come under the consideration of this
court. It is impossible to make persons, who will not concur,
carry on business jointly for their own common advantage. It is
that which makes everything of this kind exceedingly uncertain.
It is that which makes this court, on all such occasions, exceed-
ingly anxious (an anxiety, I believe, that has been felt by every
judge who has ever sat in a court of equity), that when these
disputes do arise, the parties should, if possible, come to some
arrangement between themselves to do that for their common
POWER OF PARTNERS TO WITHDRAW
benefit which the court cannot do otherwise than at the common
expense. But if the parties insist on having a declaration of their
rights, the court has, over and over again, entertained the juris-
diction, and must entertain the jurisdiction unless some one or two
of several partners are to be permitted to do just as they like with
the partnership rights and interests." See also, dicta of Lord
Chancellor HARDWICKE, in Buxton v. Lister, 3 Atk. 382.
THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE.-In the case of Skinner v. Dayton,,
19 Johns. 538 (1822), a question arose as to whether or not a
certain article of a copartnership agreement was intende-d to secure
to each partner the right of withdrawal at his pleasure, and Mr.
Justice PLATT, in discussing that question, said the article could
not be interpreted as giving such a right, "because each partner
would have the same right without any such provision." "It is a
right," said he, "inseparably incident . to every partnership.
There can be no such thing as an indissoluble partnership.
Every partner has an indefeasible right to dissolve partnership as
to all future contracts, by publishing his own volition to that
effect; and after such publication the other members of the firm
have no capacity to bind him by any contract. Even where part-
ners covenant with each other that the partnership shall continue
seven years, either partner may dissolve it the next day by pro-
claiming his determination so to do; the only consequence being
that thereby he subjects himself to a claim for damages for the
breach of covenant. The power given by one partner to another
to make joint contracts for them both, is not only a revocable
power but a man can do no act to divest himself of the capacity to
revoke it."
The partnership in that case seems, however, to have been
entered into for an indefinite period, and, consequently, Mr.
Justice PLATT'S remarks, so far as they applied to partnerships for
a term of years, were mere obiter dicta ; dicta, moreover, which
Chief Justice SPENCER, who also delivered an opinion in the case,
did not find it necessary to assent to, though he reached the same
conclusions arrived at by Mr. Justice PLATT.
The latter cited no authority in support of his views upon this
subject, and with the exception of the works of certain commen-
tators upon the civil law, there is no authority which he could' have
cited which would have borne him out. The doctrine he so boldly
advanced has been given an undeserved prominence by being
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referred to with apparent approval by Chancellor KENT in his Com-
mentaries (3 Com. 55); and some other American text writers
have hesitated whether to adopt it or not. But there is no good
reason for such hesitation. Mr. Justice PLATT'S views have been
emphatically condemned by the courts even in his own state.
In the case of Ferrero v. Bulmeyer, 34 How. Pr. 33, the
question of whether or not either member of a partnership entered
into for a definite period can dissolve it at will without just cause,
came squarely before the Superior Court and was decided in the
negative. Mr. Justice JONES, who delivered the opinion of the
court, after criticising the views expressed by Mr. Justice PLATT
in Skinner v. -Dayton, very severely, said: "Moreover, I have
been unable (the views expressed by the learned judge in the cases
in Johnson, above commented on, to the contrary notwithstanding),
to perceive any good reason why parties should not be allowed to
enter a partnership for a specified period of time; on the contrary,
the present large and extended commercial interests would seem to
require the formation of such contracts. Nor do I perceive any
good reason why, having entered into such contract, a party thereto
should, before the expiration of the time, be allowed to put an end
to it by his own mere will and caprice, any more than he can be
allowed, in such manner, to put an end to any other contract. As
to the suggestion that discord and litigation would ensue if partners
were not allowed to dissolve their connection at pleasure, the
Court of Chancery has ample power to apply a correction by way
of injunction, and when necessary, by a decree of dissolution.
This is the proper forum to which to intrust the corrective, and not
to individual members of a firm to exercise by way of dissolution
their mere whim and caprice."
And Smith v. Mulock, 1 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 374; s. c. 1 Rob.
569, and Bishop v. Breekles, 1 Hoff. Ch. (N. Y.) 534, are to the
same effect.
So, in Stevenson v. Shields, 7 La. 433, it was held that where a
firm is composed of several partners, and according to the articles
of agreement one of them is to be a silent partner, and the part-
nership is to continue for a definite period, the others cannot by
mutual consent and notice dissolve the partnership without the
silent partner's consent.
Again, in Cole v. Afoxley', 12 W. Va. 730, where it appeared
that one of the members of a partnership entered into for a definite
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period, had at a certain time previous to the expiration of the
agreed term, refused to allow his copartner to have anything
further to do with the business, and claimed to have dissolved the
partnership, it was held as in the above cases, that "a partnership
for a limited period cannot be dissolved at the mere pleasure of one
of the partners." A dicta to that effect had previously been
delivered by one of the judges of the same court in McMahon v.
Mclernan, 10 W. Va. 419.
We have also the dicta of two eminent judges of other courts in
favor of this view of the question.
In the case of Rowell v. Harvey, 5 Ark. 281, in which the
question before the court was as to the dissolution of a partnership
at will, Judge LACY, in delivering the opinion, said that a "part-
nership for a limited period of time cannot be dissolved at the mere
pleasure of one of the parties within the time prescribed. On the
contrary, it only can be dissolved from just motives and for a
reasonable cause." And in the case of Pearpoint v. Graham, 4
Wash. C. C. 234, which is frequently referred to upon this. point,
Judge WASHINGTON said, in delivering the opinion of the court,
that "it is perfectly clear that one partner cannot, by withdrawing
himself from the association before the period stipulated between
the partners for its continuance, either dissolve the partnership or
extricate himself from the responsibility of a partner, either in
respect to his associates or to third persons; and if this be so, it
would seem that he could not produce the same consequence by any
voluntary act of his own."
This is the view adopted by Judge STORY also, who, in his work
on Partnerships (sect. 275) says: "Whenever a .stipulation is
positively made that the partnership shall endure for a fixed period,
or for a particular adventure or voyage, it would seem to be at once
inequitable and injurious to permit any partner, at his mere pleas-
ure, to violate his engagement, and thereby to jeopard, if not to
sacrifice, the whole object of the partnership; for the success of
the whole undertaking may depend upon the due accomplishment
of the adventure or voyage, or the entire time be required to put
the partnership into beneficial operation. It is no answer to say
that such a violation of the engagement may entitle the injured
party to a compensation in damages; for independently of the
delay and uncertainty attendant upon any such mode of redress, it
is obvious that the remedy may be and must be, in many cases,
AT WILL FROM PARTNERSHIPS.
utterly inadequate and unsatisfactory. If there be any real and
just ground for the abandonment of the partnership, a court of
equity is competent to administer suitable redress. But that is
exceedingly different from the right of the partner, sua sponte,
from mere caprice or at his own pleasure, to dissolve the partner-
ship. In short, the opposite doctrine is founded upon reasons
exceedingly artificial, if not indefensible." See also, .Durbin v.
Barber, 14 Ohio 311.
In Iowa the question is considered doubtful: Blake v. Dorgan,
I G. Gr. 537.
In Pennsylvania it has been twice passed upon by inferior courts,
but does not seem to have ever come squarely before the Supreme
Court. It first arose in Mason v. (onnell, 1 Whart. 381. The
partnership in question there had been entered into for a term of
three years. The defence was that the defendants had withdrawn
from the firm before the debt sued for was contracted. At the
trial Judge ROGERS charged the jury, following Skinner v. Dray-
ton, that "there is no such thing as an indissoluble partnership.
It is revocable in its own nature, and each party may, by giving
due notice, dissolve the partnership as to all future capacity of the
firm to bind him by contract; and he has the same legal power,
even though the parties had covenanted with each other that the
.partnership should continue for such a period. The only conse-
quence of such a revocation of the partnership power in the inter-
mediate time would be that the partner would subject himself to a
claim for damages." The case was reviewed in the Supreme Court
upon a motion for a new trial, but as the motion did not call the.
coxrectness of the above proposition in question, it cannot be con-
sidered to have been there passed upon by that tribunal, and with
the exc,,ption of a dictum of Judge SHARSWOOD in Slemmer's
Appeal, 58 Penn. St. 168, favoring the view adopted by Judge
ROGERS, we have really nothing from the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court upon the subject.
Von Tagen v. .oberts, 2 Pearson 137, which is the latest
Pennsylvania case in point, went no higher than the Court of
Common Pleas, where it was tried before Judge PEARSON. That
learned judge, after a careful investigation of the subject, refused
to follow Mason v. Connell, supra, and held, notwithstanding the.
dictum of Judge SHARSWOOD, that a partner cannot withdraw from
a partnership entered into for a term of years before the expiration
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of that period agreed upon, without he had just cause for doing so.
He considered the doctrine of Mason v. Connell not only opposed
to the better authorities, but also to sound reason and the prin-
ciples of moral honesty.
Thus we find that the dictum of Mr. Justice PLATT is not only
opposed to the English authorities, but has been condemned in
America in every case in which the question now under discussion
has arisen, except Mason v. Convell, supra, in which his view had
the honor to be adopted by a Nisi Prius Court.
I therefore consider myself justified, in view of all the authorities,
in stating that the rule sanctioned by the united voice of the
Roman, the French, the Scotch and the English jurists, and above
all by the voice of honor, is now the established rule in America.
ExcUPTIOs.-lHaving, as it is believed, shown what the general
rule governing this subject is, the next question is as to whether or
not there are any exceptions to it.
It seems that a partnership entered into for a definite period
would be dissolved by the suicide of a partner, notwithstanding the
voluntary nature of the act; but there are no decisions in point,
and as the subject is of little practical importance we will pass
'on to a discussion of the effect of-st. Assignments. 2d. Mar-
riage.
1. A8s&gnments.-It is well settled that unless there is a pro-
vision in the articles of copartnership to the contrary (Merrick v.
Brainard, 38 Barb. 574), an assignment by a partner of his inter-
est in a firm entered into for an indefinite period, will effect a dis-
solution of the partnership if such is the intention : Ketcham v.
Clark, 6 Johns. 144; Ogden v. Gregg, 29 Hun 146; Murray v.
Bogert, 14 Johns. 318; Kingman v. Spur, 7 Pick. 235; Morss
v. Gleason, 64 N. Y. 204; Thompson v. Spittle, 102 Mass. 207.
And where an assignment is made by a member of such a firm the
presumption of law seems to be, that he intends that it shall
work a dissolution; but that presumption is not conclusive, and if,
ii. fact, he does not intend to dissolve the firm a dissolution will
not result: Monroe v. Hamilton, 60 Ala. 227 ; Taft v. Buffum,
14 Pick. 322; Bank v. Towle, 4 Jones Eq. 8; Du Pont v. Me-
Laran, 61 Mo. 502; State v. Quick, 10 Ia. 451. At least this
seems to be the rule where the assignment is voluntary. The
authorities are conflicting -as to the effect of involuntary assign-
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•ments: 07hoppin v. Wilson, 27 La. Ann. 444; contra, 1arquand
v. Affg. Co., 17 Johns. 525; Spalding v. Black, 22 Kans, 55;
Benton v. Garter, 9 N. J. Eq. 62.
The presumption as to intention where an assignment is made,
does not seem to exist where a partner merely mortgages his
interest : Du -Pont v. I~eLaran, 61 Mo. 502; State v. Quick, 10
Ia. 451.
Where a partnership is entered into for a definite period, the
effect of a voluntai" assignment by one of the partners of his
interest in the firm is different. The question in such cases is not
so much as to the intention of the assignor, for that is not neces-
sarily conclusive, but rather as to the necessary effect of the assign-
ment regardless of intention.
In the case of Ferrero v. Buhlmeyer, 34 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 33,
the question whether or not a voluntary assignment made by a
member of a partnership for a term of years, can effect a dissolu-
tion arose, and this whole subject was discussed at considerable
length and with great ability by Judge JONES, who delivered the
opinion of the court. After reaching the conclusion that a member
of a partnership entered into for a term of years, cannot withdraw
at will without just cause, he continued as follows: "The next
point of inquiry is, whether a purely voluntary assignment by one
partner, of his right and interest in a copartnership limited to con-
tinue for a specified period, is not such an act as, notwithstanding
its voluntary character, dissolves the partnership. The learned
judge in Marquand v. .Mfg. Co., 17 Johns. 538, is of opinion
that it is, because in his view it brings in interests which are incom-
patible with the carrying on of. the business as originally organ-
ized, and because so that the assignee is according to acknowledged
principles entitled to a division of assets if he insists upon it.
With all due respect to the opinion of the learned judge, I feel
obliged to differ. The question is, what has a partner a right to
transfer by an assignment, for it is clear that he can pass to his
assignee only such interests and powers as he has a right to trans-
fer. It necessarily results from the doctrine that a partner cannot
by his purely voluntary act dissolve the partnership, or make such
act cause for a decree of a dissolution in his own application, that
he cannot transfer any such right. It is also evident that he can-
not transfer those rights, powers and duties which, by the partner-
ship connection, he is bound to exercise and perform personally
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for the benefit of the partnership itself, nor can he transfer any right
or power, the exercise of which would be antagonistic to the partner-.
ship articles. He can, by such an arrangement, transfer only his
interest in the goods and profits, subject to all the equities, but can
transfer none of his personal rights, powers and duties. What are
the equities subject to which the assignee takes ? He takes subject
to the covenants and contracts existing between the partners.
Among these covenants are:
"1st. That the goods and assets shall remiin under the control
and in the possession of the partners; and the debts due the
firm shall be collected by, or the debts due from the firm paid by
the partners, consequently the assignee is not entitled to participate
in such control and possession, or to interfere in the collection or
payment of such debts.
"2d. That the goods and chattels shall be sold by the partners in
the usual course of trade, and the proceeds thereof and other assets
used by the partners in the legitimate prosecution of the business
during the term of the partnership.
"Therefore the assignee takes no right to sell or dispose of the
goods, or to insist on their sale, otherwise than in the legitimate
prosecution of the business, and no right to insist upon the pay-
ment to him, or otherwise, of any portion of the proceeds, or of the
other assets, except as provided for by the contract, and no right to
insist on the application of the proceeds of the goods sold, or other
assets, in a manner contrary to the contract, or in any one par-
ticular manner in preference to several authorized by the coAtract.
"3d. That all the partnership matters shall be under the con-
trol and supervision of the partners.
"1 Therefore the assignee takes no right to participate in such
contract or supervision. These various matters are attached to the
persons of the partners, and although a partner may assign the
pecuniary interest, yet he cannot assign the personal rights. It is
like unto a contract for personal services, which cannot be assigned
without the consent of the employer, so as to enable the assignee
to perform the services and receive pay therefor ; yet the emolu-
ment may be assigned, so that when earned by the employee it
may be recovered by the assignee.
"There is nothing to prevent a partner who has assigned his share
or interest, from still continuing to perform these duties and exer-
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cising the powers attached to his person, which are to be performed
and exercised for the benefit of the partnership.
"While on the other hand he transfers to his assignee those rights
and powers which he may exercise for his own individual benefit,
and among them a right to call for an account according to the
terms of the partnership contract, a right to demand a dissolution
for such causes, and under such circumstances as he himself could;
and a right upon the dissolution of the partnership by the influx
of time, to apply to the court to wind up his affairs.
"Under this construction of the effect of a voluntary assignment
made by one partner of his share, there is no new element imported
into the partnership, and no right in the assignee to demand an
immediate division of the assets.
"One who purchases such an interest from a partner must take
cum onere the obligations resting on that partner."
Ferrero v. Buhlmeyer, is believed to be the only case bearing
directly upon this point. It was, indeed, said by Mr. Justice
STRONG, in Bank v. Carrollton Railroad, 78 U. S. 628, where
the partnership had been entered into for a term of years, and
Graham, one of the partners, had assigned his interest in the firm
before the expiration of the term that "the effect of Graham's
assignment * * * was undoubtedly to dissolve the partnership,"
but the decision of that case turned upon an entirely different
point, and what was there said amounts to little more than an
obliter dictum.
In the case of Marquand v. Mfg. Co., 17 Johns. 525, referred
to by Judge JONES, the question was as to whether or not a partner-
ship entered into for a term of years, was dissolved by an assign-
ment by an insolvent partner of his interest in the firm to a
creditor whom he was unable to pay, and who was in a position to
enforce his claim at law and satisfy it by buying in the interest
assigned; and it was held, in substance, that the assignment was
not voluntary, and that it operated to dissolve the firm : Perrero v.
Buhlmyer, 34 How. 35.
2. 21irriage.-It seems tolerably well settled that where a
partner, who is a feme sole, marries either one of her copartners
(Bassett v. Shepard, 16 The Rep. 755), or a stranger (Nerot v.
Burnand, 4 Russ. (Eng.) 260), (Antoine v. -Dallaire, 2 Rev. de Leg.
74), the partnership is immediately dissolved, if at will, except in
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those states where the common-law disabilities of married women
have been removed by statute. It is so held for two reasons:
1st. Because at common law all a woman's personal property
and effects are transferred by her marriage to her husband.
2d. Because married women cannot bind themselves by contract.
Whether the marriage of a female partner will dissolve a part-
nership entered into for a definite period, is a question which has
never been passed upon by a court of last resort, either in this
country or England.
The mere transfer of her interest in the firm to her husband,
would appear from the cases already cited, insufficient of itself to
cause a dissolution.
The inability of married .women to make binding contracts seems,
at first glance, a more conclusive reason for holding that a woman
cannot, under any circumstances, remain a partner after marriage.
But this does not seem so clear when we remember that the
power which the majority of the members of a partnership entered
into for a term of years, have to dispose of the partnership pro-
perty in the usual course of trade, and the proceeds thereof, and
other assets in the legitimate prosecution of the business during the
term of the partnership, is a power coupled with an interest, and
therefore not necessarily revoked by marriage.
It has never been held that a partnership entered into by persons
who are sui juris for a term of years, can be dissolved by one of
the partners afterwards becoming non sui juris. On the contrary,
.it is well settled that the insanity of a partner does not work a dis-
solution in such cases: Jones v. Noy, 2 Myl. & K. (Eng.) 125 ;
Mellersh v. Keen, 27 Beav. (Eng.) 236; Bagshaw v. Parker, 10
Id. 532; Sayer v. Bennet, 1 Cox (Eng.) 107; Sanders v.
Sanders, 2 Collyer (Eng.) 276.
In delivering the opinion of the court in Wrexham v. Hudle-
8ton, 1 Swanst. 514, where a member of a firm entered into for a
term of years, had become insane and remained so during the
remainder of the term, Lord ELDON said, "that lunacy does not
dissolve the partnership, even as to the party incapacitated, much
less as to the rest, and though in partnerships the parties rely upon
the mutual skill and assistance of each other, yet that is to be
tinderstood subject to the common accidents of life, as lunacy is."
If lunacy is a "common accident of life" marriage is still more
